Repeated Game Strategies in Local and Group Prisoner`s Dilemma
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Repeated Game Strategies in Local and Group Prisoner`s Dilemma
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| Id. |
40365705 |
| Titulo |
Repeated Game Strategies in Local and Group Prisoner`s Dilemma |
| Autor(es) |
Kirchkamp, Oliver
Nagel, Rosemarie
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| Localización |
RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:00-50
http://www.kirchkamp.de/research/expLocII.html
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| Versión |
1.0 |
| Estado |
Final
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| Descripción |
We investigate and compare different approaches to derive strategies from observed data in spatial and spaceless prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We start with a model where players choose a fixed action that remains constant for all repetitions of a stage game. As an extension we then allow players to choose simple repeated game strategies that, however, remain fixed over the course of the game. We then discuss a method how to identify changing repeated game strategies. This method is used to study a simple reinforcement model. We find that in a spatial structure reinforcement plays a more important role than in a spaceless structure.
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| Tipo de recurso |
preprint
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| Tipo de Interactividad |
Expositivo
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| Nivel de Interactividad |
muy bajo
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| Audiencia |
Estudiante
Profesor
Autor
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| Estructura |
Atomic |
| Coste |
no
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| Copyright |
sí
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| Requerimientos técnicos |
Browser: Any
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| Fecha de contribución |
18-mar-2009 |
| Contacto |
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