Resource data
Stochastic stability in three-player games
Kaminski, Dominik Miekisz, Jacek Zaborowski, Marcin
Location:
http://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0412041
Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic
models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their
strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games.
Only recently evolutionarily stable strategies were defined for multi-player
games and their properties analyzed (Broom et al., 1997). Here we study the
long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of populations of randomly matched
individuals playing symmetric three-player games. We analyze stochastic
stability of equilibria in games with multiple evolutionarily stable
strategies. We also show that in some games, a population may not evolve in the
long run to an evolutionarily stable equilibrium.
Belongs to: arXiv
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Detalles del recurso
|
Stochastic stability in three-player games
|
| Id. |
20880383 |
| Titulo |
Stochastic stability in three-player games |
| Autor(es) |
Kaminski, Dominik Miekisz, Jacek Zaborowski, Marcin |
| Location |
http://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0412041
|
| Versión |
1.0 |
| Estado |
Final
|
| Descripción |
Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic
models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their
strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games.
Only recently evolutionarily stable strategies were defined for multi-player
games and their properties analyzed (Broom et al., 1997). Here we study the
long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of populations of randomly matched
individuals playing symmetric three-player games. We analyze stochastic
stability of equilibria in games with multiple evolutionarily stable
strategies. We also show that in some games, a population may not evolve in the
long run to an evolutionarily stable equilibrium. |
| Palabras clave |
Quantitative Biology - Populations and Evolution |
| Tipo de recurso |
Texto Narrativo
|
| Tipo de Interactividad |
Expositivo
|
| Nivel de Interactividad |
muy bajo
|
| Audiencia |
Estudiante
Profesor
Autor
|
| Estructura |
Atomic |
| Coste |
no
|
| Copyright |
sí
|
| Requerimientos técnicos |
Browser: Any |
| Fecha de contribución |
28-mar-2007 |
| Contacto |
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