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A Belief-Function Logic

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Marcadores Sociales
A Belief-Function Logic
Id. 41452152
Idioma inglés
Titulo A Belief-Function Logic
Autor(es) Alessandro Saffiotti
Localización http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/18180.html
Versión 1.0
Estado Final
Descripción We present BFL, a hybrid logic for representing uncertain knowledge. BFL attaches a quantified notion of belief --- based on Dempster-Shafer's theory of belief functions --- to classical first-order logic. The language of BFL is composed of objects of the form F:[a,b], where F is a firstorder sentence, and a and b are numbers in the [0,1] interval (with ab). Intuitively, a measures the strength of our belief in the truth of F, and (1--b) that in its falseness. A number of properties of first-order logic nicely generalize to BFL; in return, BFL gives us a new perspective on some important points of Dempster-Shafer theory (e.g., the role of Dempster's combination rule). Introduction Logic plays a central role in the task of representing knowledge in artificial intelligence. Much of logical tradition is concerned with two-valued logics, i.e. logics in which we can only talk about propositions being completely true or completely false (possibly, according to a given believer). This contr...
Tipo ps
Palabras clave Alessandro Saffiotti A Belief-Function Logic
Tipo de Interactividad Expositivo
Nivel de Interactividad muy bajo
Audiencia Estudiante
Profesor
Autor
Estructura Atomic
Coste no
Copyright
unrestricted
Formatos ps
Requerimientos técnicos Browser: Any
Relación [IsBasedOn] ftp://tintin.oru.se/pub/saffiotti/uncertainty/aaai92.ps.gz
[References] oai:CiteSeerPSU:122935
[References] oai:CiteSeerPSU:18180
Fecha de contribución 31-mar-2009
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