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We develop a game theoretic model of 2 candidate competition over a multidimensional policy space, where the participants have incomplete information about the preferences and strategy choices of other participants. The players consist of the voters and the candidates. Voters are partitioned into two classes, depending on the information they observe. Informed voters observe candidate strategy choices while uninformed voters do not. All players (voters and candidates alike) observe contemporaneous poll data broken down by various subgroups of the population. The main results of the paper give conditions on the number and distribution of the informed and uninformed voters which are sufficient to guarantee that any equilibrium (or voter equilibrium) extracts all information.

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Caltech Authors  

Autor(es)

McKelvey, Richard D. -  Ordeshook, Peter C. - 

Id.: 70095282

Versión: 1.0

Estado: Final

Tipo:  application/pdf - 

Tipo de recurso: Report or Paper  -  PeerReviewed  - 

Tipo de Interactividad: Expositivo

Nivel de Interactividad: muy bajo

Audiencia: Estudiante  -  Profesor  -  Autor  - 

Estructura: Atomic

Coste: no

Copyright: sí

Formatos:  application/pdf - 

Requerimientos técnicos:  Browser: Any - 

Relación: [References] http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170919-154054641
[References] http://authors.library.caltech.edu/81591/

Fecha de contribución: 22-sep-2017

Contacto:

Localización:
* McKelvey, Richard D. and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1984) Elections with Limited Information: A Multidimensional Model. Social Science Working Paper, 529. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170919-154054641

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