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Organs for transplantation are a scarce resource. Paying to increase the supply of organs is illegal in much of the world. We review efforts to increase transplantation by increasing the supply of available organs from living and deceased donors. Progress has been made in increasing the availability of living donor kidneys through kidney exchange. Recent legislation in Israel aims at encouraging deceased donation by awarding priority for receiving organs to registered donors. We also explore the manner in which organ donation is solicited and present evidence to suggest that some recent movement towards "mandated choice" may be counterproductive.

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Kessler, Judd B. -  Roth, Alvin E. - 

Id.: 69632454

Idioma: inglés (Estados Unidos)  - 

Versión: 1.0

Estado: Final

Tipo de recurso: Journal Article  - 

Tipo de Interactividad: Expositivo

Nivel de Interactividad: muy bajo

Audiencia: Estudiante  -  Profesor  -  Autor  - 

Estructura: Atomic

Coste: no

Copyright: sí

: open

Requerimientos técnicos:  Browser: Any - 

Relación: [References] 10.1257/aer.104.5.425
[References] http://web.stanford.edu/~alroth/papers/KesslerRoth_OrganLessons_PP_v10.pdf
[References] American Economic Review

Fecha de contribución: 11-feb-2017


* Quick submit: 2017-02-07T20:47:40-0500
* Kessler, Judd B., and Alvin E. Roth. 2014. “Getting More Organs for Transplantation.” American Economic Review 104 (5) (May): 425–430. doi:10.1257/aer.104.5.425.
* 0002-8282

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