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Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings

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Detalles del recurso

Pertenece a: ETD at Indian Institute of Science  

Descripción: Allocation of objects or resources to competing agents is a ubiquitous problem in the real world. For example, a federal government may wish to allocate different types of spectrum licenses to telecom service providers; a search engine has to assign different sponsored slots to the ads of advertisers; etc. The agents involved in such situations have private preferences over the allocations. The agents, being strategic, may manipulate the allocation procedure to get a favourable allocation. If the objects to be allocated are heterogeneous (rather than homogeneous), the problem becomes quite complex. The allocation problem becomes even more formidable in the presence of a dynamic supply and/or demand. This doctoral work is motivated by such problems involving strategic agents, heterogeneous objects, and dynamic supply and/or demand. In this thesis, we model such problems in a standard game theoretic setting and use mechanism design to propose novel solutions to the problems. We extend the current state-of-the-art in a non-trivial way by solving the following problems: Optimal combinatorial auctions with single minded bidders, generalizing the existing methods to take into account multiple units of heterogeneous objects Multi-armed bandit mechanisms for sponsored search auctions with multiple slots, generalizing the current methods that only consider a single slot. Strategyproof redistribution mechanisms for heterogeneous objects, expanding the scope of the current state of practice beyond homogeneous objects Online allocation mechanisms without money for one-sided and two-sided matching markets, extending the existing methods for static settings.

Autor(es): Prakash, Gujar Sujit - 

Id.: 55211345

Idioma: inglés (Estados Unidos)  - 

Versión: 1.0

Estado: Final

Palabras claveInvestments (Economics) -  Allocation - 

Tipo de recurso: Thesis  - 

Tipo de Interactividad: Expositivo

Nivel de Interactividad: muy bajo

Audiencia: Estudiante  -  Profesor  -  Autor  - 

Estructura: Atomic

Coste: no

Copyright: sí

Requerimientos técnicos:  Browser: Any - 

Relación: [References] G24693

Fecha de contribución: 21-abr-2012

Contacto:

Localización:


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