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Descripción

Boxing was legalized in California through a statewide referendum in 1924that simultaneously set up a regulatory authority with broad powers to control the industry. This study examines the economic performance of the boxing industry, the case for regulatory intervention, and the effects of the specific kinds of regulatory rules that have been imposed. While regulation in California is widely believed to be an important factor explaining the unusually low rates of death and injury in boxing matches in the state, it is also shown to have anticompetitive effects. Several changes in regulatory procedures are proposed that would not reduce the extent to which regulation protects boxers, but would serve to enhance the competitive performance of the industry.

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Caltech Authors  

Autor(es)

Balbien, Joel -  Noll, Roger G. -  Quirk, James P. - 

Id.: 70125688

Versión: 1.0

Estado: Final

Tipo:  application/pdf - 

Tipo de recurso: Report or Paper  -  PeerReviewed  - 

Tipo de Interactividad: Expositivo

Nivel de Interactividad: muy bajo

Audiencia: Estudiante  -  Profesor  -  Autor  - 

Estructura: Atomic

Coste: no

Copyright: sí

Formatos:  application/pdf - 

Requerimientos técnicos:  Browser: Any - 

Relación: [References] http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171006-140153591
[References] https://authors.library.caltech.edu/82181/

Fecha de contribución: 07-oct-2017

Contacto:

Localización:
* Balbien, Joel and Noll, Roger G. and Quirk, James P. (1981) The Economics of Boxing Regulation in California. Social Science Working Paper, 366. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171006-140153591

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