Quelhas, Ana Cristina; Rasga, Célia Maria Batalha Silva; Johnson-Laird, Philip N.
The theory of mental models postulates that meaning and knowledge can modulate the interpretation of conditionals. The theory's computer implementation implied that certain conditionals should be true or false without the need for evidence. Three experiments corroborated this prediction. In Experiment 1, nearly 500 participants evaluated 24 conditionals as true or false, and they justified their judgments by completing sentences of the form, It is impossible that A and ___ appropriately. In Experiment 2, participants evaluated 16 conditionals and provided their own justifications, which tended to be explanations rather than logical justifications. In Experiment 3, the participants also evaluated as possible...
Couto, Marta Barley de La Cueva; Quelhas, Ana Cristina; Byrne, Ruth M. J.
Two experiments examine how people interpret and reason about advice conditionals,
such as tips, for example, “if you study more your grades will improve”, and warnings,
for example, “if you stop exercising you will gain weight”. Experiment 1 showed that
when participants reason about whether a tip or warning could be true in different
situations, their judgments correspond to a biconditional or conditional interpretation
on about half of all trials, but to an enabling or tautology interpretation on many
others. Experiment 2 showed that participants make few modus ponens and tollens
inferences from tips and warnings, and more modus ponens inferences from tips than
warnings. The implications for...
Rasga, Célia Maria Batalha Silva; Quelhas, Ana Cristina; Byrne, Ruth M. J.
We examine false belief and counterfactual reasoning in children with autism with a new change-of-intentions task. Children listened to stories, for example, Anne is picking up toys and John hears her say she wants to find her ball. John goes away and the reason for Anne's action changes-Anne's mother tells her to tidy her bedroom. We asked, 'What will John believe is the reason that Anne is picking up toys?' which requires a false-belief inference, and 'If Anne's mother hadn't asked Anne to tidy her room, what would have been the reason she was picking up toys?' which requires a...
Kleiman, Tali; Hassin, Ran R.; Trope, Yaacov
Numerous daily situations require control for successful goal attainment. An important question is
whether control can adjust across situations, to create control readiness from one situation to the next.
Using trial to trial control adjustment paradigms, previous research generally suggested that control
adjustments are domain specific. However, this research typically used neutral stimuli (e.g., single letters)
devoid of personally and socially relevant goals. We propose that personal relevance may be an important
modulator of control adjustment and, hence, that personally relevant control tasks can benefit from
control readiness, even if it is produced by a different task. In 2 experiments we test whether control over