Mostrando recursos 1 - 5 de 5

  1. Honesty on the Streets. A Field Study on Newspaper Purchasing

    Pruckner, Gerald J.; Sausgruber, Rupert
    Many publishers use an honor system for selling newspapers in the street. We conducted a field experiment to study honesty in this market, finding that a moral reminder increases the level of honesty in payments, whereas the same message has no effect on whether one is honest. Reminding customers of the legal norm has no effect. We argue that these results are consistent with a preference for honesty, based on an internalized social norm. Auxiliary evidence suggests that the moral message remains effective when it is posted for longer periods, and even when it is removed again. (authors' abstract)
    (application/pdf) - 18-oct-2016

  2. Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information

    Fellner, Gerlinde; Sausgruber, Rupert; Traxler, Christian
    We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailings, a threat treatment which makes a high detection risk salient has a significant deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance on aggregate. However, the information condition has a weak positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. (authors' abstract)
    (application/pdf) - 18-oct-2016

  3. Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information

    Fellner, Gerlinde; Sausgruber, Rupert; Traxler, Christian
    We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailings, a threat treatment which makes a high detection risk salient has a significant deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance on aggregate. However, the information condition has a weak positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. (authors' abstract)
    (application/pdf) - 29-ago-2017

  4. Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information

    Fellner, Gerlinde; Sausgruber, Rupert; Traxler, Christian
    We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailings, a threat treatment which makes a high detection risk salient has a significant deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance on aggregate. However, the information condition has a weak positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. (authors' abstract)
    (application/pdf) - 03-sep-2017

  5. Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information

    Fellner, Gerlinde; Sausgruber, Rupert; Traxler, Christian
    We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailings, a threat treatment which makes a high detection risk salient has a significant deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance on aggregate. However, the information condition has a weak positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. (authors' abstract)
    (application/pdf) - 04-sep-2017

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