http://biblioteca.universia.net/searchAutor.do?q=Rosemarie%20Nagel Resultados 1 - 10 de 66 de Rosemarie Nagel. (0,16 segundos) es http://biblioteca.universia.net/img/logotipo.jpg http://biblioteca.universia.net/ http://biblioteca.universia.net/ficha.do?id=661071 Vídeo de la conferencia de mismo nombre impartida por Rosemarie Nagel y perteneciente al curso de Doctorado en Neurociencias: ¿El Cerebro Social o Construcción Social de la Realidad? Rosemarie Nagel http://biblioteca.universia.net/ficha.do?id=39997676 A large number of players have to state simultaneously a number in the closed interval (0,100). The winner is the player whose stated number is closed to p-fold average of all chosen numbers, where p is a fixed and commonly known positive parameter. The game is repeated for several rounds. In the first round most of the stated numbers are far away from an equilibrium point. In the succeeding rounds, they approach an equilibrium or converge to it. We propose a simple theory of first round beha... Nagel, Rosemarie http://biblioteca.universia.net/ficha.do?id=40509680 Nagel, Rosemarie http://biblioteca.universia.net/ficha.do?id=40365667 We experimentally study the effects of locality in a repeated prisoners' dilemma. We compare players located on a circle with those in neighbourless groups. On circles players interact only with neighbours, but not with distant players. In groups all players interact with each other in the same way. We observe less cooperation on circles than in (neighbourless) groups. This is explained through different learning behaviour and a different way to use cooperation as a signal. Kirchkamp, Oliver; Nagel, Rosemarie http://biblioteca.universia.net/ficha.do?id=40365705 We investigate and compare different approaches to derive strategies from observed data in spatial and spaceless prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We start with a model where players choose a fixed action that remains constant for all repetitions of a stage game. As an extension we then allow players to choose simple repeated game strategies that, however, remain fixed over the course of the game. We then discuss a method how to identify changing repeated game strategies. This method is used t... Kirchkamp, Oliver; Nagel, Rosemarie http://biblioteca.universia.net/ficha.do?id=40365775 We investigate and compare different approaches to derive strategies from laboratory data in prisoners' dilemmas experiments. While theory suggests more cooperation in spatial structures than in spaceless ones, we find in our experiments either the opposite or no difference. In this paper we investigate to which degree learning and reinforcement explains this dependence on structure and information. Starting from a very simple model we gradually develop a setup where players use repeated game... Kirchkamp, Oliver; Nagel, Rosemarie http://biblioteca.universia.net/ficha.do?id=40365813 This study disentangles experimentally imitation, reinforcement, and reciprocity in repeated prisoners' dilemmas. We compare a simple situation in which players interact only with their neighbours (local interaction) with one where players interact with all members of the population (group interaction). We observe choices under different information conditions and estimate parameters of a learning model. We find that imitation, while assumed to be a driving force in many models of spatial evo... Kirchkamp, Oliver; Nagel, Rosemarie http://biblioteca.universia.net/ficha.do?id=40365944 In this paper we study learning and cooperation in repeated prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We compare interaction neighbourhoods of different sizes and structure and we observe choices under different information conditions and estimate parameters of a learning model. We test robustness of the eastimator. We find that imitation, albeit a driving force in many models of spatial evolution, is often a negligible factor in the experiment. As a result, we find less cooperation. Kirchkamp, Oliver; Nagel, Rosemarie http://biblioteca.universia.net/ficha.do?id=38556084 We examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and fewer singles than with mutual choice. Furthermore, with the unilateral choice setup we are able to show that intending defectors are more likely to try to avoid a match than intending cooperators. We comp... Hauk, Esther; Nagel, Rosemarie http://biblioteca.universia.net/ficha.do?id=38558705 Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-per... Grosskopf, Brit; Nagel, Rosemarie